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áÅÐá¤èÊÑ»´ÒËì¡è͹ The Economist ÁÕº·ÇÔà¤ÃÒÐËìÍÍ¡ÁҴѧ¹Õé
Thailand Protests and coup rumours return
May 29th 2008 | BANGKOK From The Economist print edition Thailand's squabbling elites seem intent on ruining the country
WHEN an elected government took office in January, after 16 months of military rule, Thailand looked as if it might be returning to stable democracy. The army chiefs who had removed Thaksin Shinawatra's government in a coup in September 2006 accepted being overruled by the public, who voted into office a coalition led by Mr Thaksin's supporters. But political tension is now rising again. Anti-government protests have returned, raising fears that the army might use street violence, or the supposed threats to the monarchy from Mr Thaksin's allies, as pretexts for another coup.
On May 25th the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), an anti-Thaksin group, returned to the streets with a rally in central Bangkok. Only a few thousand people turned up, nothing like the masses who poured onto the streets before the 2006 coup and far fewer than the 30,000 the organisers had predicted. But it was enough to trigger a counter-demonstration from Thaksinites, with each side chucking plastic bottles at the other. More protests are promised. The police can contain such minor disorder easily. In 2006, however, similarly small-scale clashes were among the coup leaders' excuses for deposing the elected government.
The protests' return may mark the end of several months of phoney war between the two main camps in Thai politics. On one side are the Thaksinites, led by Samak Sundaravej, the new prime minister. (Mr Thaksin himself has kept a low profile, busying himself with Manchester City, the English football team he owns.) On the other is a fuzzy coalition of conservative and royalist bureaucrats, academics and soldiers, middle-class Bangkokians and the opposition Democrat Party. The Thaksinites believe the guiding force behind their opponents is General Prem Tinsulanonda, the elderly chief adviser to King Bhumibol, though the general denies this.
What has prompted the PAD's return to the streets is Mr Samak's plan to undo some of the constitutional changes made during the former military-backed government. One of these is a measure making it easier to ban a political party. Under this, the Thaksinites' new political vehicle, the People's Power Party (PPP), and two of its coalition partners face disbandment for alleged vote-fiddling in December's elections. Another constitutional change the Thaksinites want to undo is one that legitimised all the coupmakers' actions—including the creation of a powerful panel to investigate corruption allegations against Mr Thaksin. Removing this clause from the charter could get Mr Thaksin off the hook and open the possibility of putting the coupmakers themselves in the dock.
Mr Samak wants to hold a referendum to ask voters if they wish the constitution changed again. He hopes thereby to demonstrate his party's continuing popularity among the poorer, rural majority of Thais and to undermine the claims of his opponents—a group of mostly elite Bangkokians—to be “defending democracy”. This week, despite rising worries about the street clashes, the cabinet backed Mr Samak's plan to hold the referendum.
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the former army chief who led the 2006 coup, seems to have gone quietly into retirement. His successor, General Anupong Paojinda, keeps insisting that there is no coup plot—but then so did General Sonthi, right up until the tanks rolled. Mr Samak is said to have built good relations with General Anupong, perhaps as a hedge against being dumped by Mr Thaksin. This might make a coup less likely. However, lower down the army's ranks Mr Thaksin has both supporters and diehard opponents, any of whom might conceivably hatch their own plots.
The anti-Thaksin movement's language, accusing the government of “divisiveness”, sounds much as it did in the build-up to the last coup. So do its accusations of lèse-majesté. Mr Thaksin's supposed disrespect for the king was yet another of the coupmakers' excuses, though they failed to produce any evidence of it. Now the same accusations are being made against Jakrapob Penkair, a minister in Mr Samak's government, over a speech he gave to foreign correspondents last year about Thailand's “patronage system” and how it hinders the country's development. The anti-Thaksinites interpret this as criticism of the monarchy, an offence punishable by 15 years in jail.
Mr Jakrapob is correct that the system under which Thais owe loyalty to their patrons, rather than the institutions they are supposed to serve, undermines the rule of law and fosters corruption. That said, Mr Thaksin's government, far from ridding Thailand of this feudal mindset, was busy creating its own patronage system. Whether the patronage mentality derives from the monarchy or not is something Thais surely have a right to discuss. The king has said he would accept criticism. But it suits the conservative establishment to retain the severe lèse-majesté law as a weapon against anyone who threatens their privileges.
After the 2006 coup the army and its allies in the bureaucracy ran the country dismally, and Thailand's economy is now among the region's slowest-growing. Even so, both sides in the conflict are talking up the chances of another coup—which would be the country's 19th since the absolute monarchy came to an end in 1932. Even if it does not go that far, prolonged political strife risks doing further economic damage. Instead of regaining its reputation as an admired, fast-developing tiger, Thailand risks becoming one of those perennially unstable, tragi-comic countries, such as the Philippines, which the outside world overlooks.
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