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A Tug of War for Thailand’s Soul
September 2006

By Colum Murphy

Inside the entrance to the Thai Rak Thai’s party headquarters in Bangkok hangs a giant photograph of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra bowing to King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Dressed in the white uniform sometimes worn by government officials, the prime minister is prostrate before the much-revered king in a gesture of devoted servitude. Yet few in Thailand believe that relations between the two men are as amiable as the photograph suggests.

HADI FARAHANI

“He [Mr. Thaksin] has pitched a fight with the Bangkok elite, including the palace—and that means the king himself,” says a Western diplomat. Earlier in the year, Mr. Thaksin reportedly said that he would step down if the king “whispered in his ear” to do so. “Well the king has not just whispered it, but has said it indirectly in public,” adds the diplomat.

With fresh elections planned for October 15, it could be only a matter of weeks before a major showdown occurs. But more is at stake than Mr. Thaksin’s political career. There would be ramifications for the monarchy as well, and its relationship with the country’s still-weak democratic institutions. A drawn-out dispute between Mr. Thaksin and the king, also known as Rama IX, threatens to derail efforts to address the challenges to Thai society such as the disparity between the rich and poor, the urban and rural, as well as systemic corruption.

Two Men, One Constituency

In the past, any discord between the king and the prime minister was kept well hidden, thanks in part to Thailand’s severe l?se majest? laws, which threaten three to 15 years in prison for anyone considered to have criticized the palace. Even though the king, in his December 2005 birthday speech, declared that he is open to criticism, most Thai and foreign analysts residing in the kingdom still balk at expressing their views on the record.

Yet it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the growing tension, some of which is as a result of the April 2 elections fiasco, which was boycotted by the main opposition parties and was later annulled by the country’s Constitution Court.

Mr. Thaksin’s handling—critics say mishandling—of the unrest in Thailand’s predominantly Muslim deep south has frequently been at odds with the king’s wishes. The palace’s hopes that the crisis could be solved through a “gentle approach” were dashed by Mr. Thaksin’s heavy-handed tactics to quell what he considers to be bandit activity. Mr. Thaksin may have agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (headed by Anand Panyarachun, who was appointed prime minister twice by the king) charged with devising a plan to bring long-term peace to the south, but he also promptly sidelined the body and largely ignored its recommendations.

At the heart of the matter is the fact that the two men draw support from the same bedrock of Thai society. No one could ever doubt the genuine affection the Thai people have for their monarch. Witness the huge outpouring of support in June this year during the 60th anniversary celebrations of King Bhumibol’s reign. Nowhere is the love for the king more heartfelt than among the poor of rural Thailand—the demographic that re-elected Mr. Thaksin and his party in February 2005, when TRT won 19 million, or 61%, of the vote.

While the rural poor are the bulwark of both the king and Mr. Thaksin, a yawning gap exists between the two men’s philosophies on how to bring prosperity to the poverty-stricken farmers. For decades the king has been championing rural development through his Buddhist-inspired economics, stressing self-sufficiency and moderation, and encouraging Thais to look more to the domestic economy for growth opportunities rather than on overrelying on export markets or fickle foreign investors.

This could not be more different from Mr. Thaksin’s ?bercapitalist and pro-globalization stance. Mr. Thaksin’s schemes to convert the rural poor into enterprising capitalists, for example, do not sit well with the more conservative, pro-monarchy quarters of Thai society who dismiss them as wasteful quick-fixes whose long-term benefits to the poor are questionable to say the least. Whether these criticisms are justified or not, his policies have made Mr. Thaksin—the “thunder out of Chiang Mai”—immensely popular.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University, says that Mr. Thaksin has managed to garner the support of the masses in a matter of four to five years. “The king took four decades of hard work to become so adored and popular.”

“I see it as a battle for the hearts and minds of the Thai people,” says Mr. Thitinan of the current state of affairs. “The king and Mr. Thaksin have the same constituency.”

Thaksin’s Troubles Cascade

The most concrete evidence of tension has emerged since last April’s national elections. When Mr. Thaksin called the snap ballot, the main opposition parties promptly boycotted. Led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), massive street protests were held in Bangkok, drawing marchers mainly from the urban elite and middle class. Mr. Thaksin was accused of abusing the country’s political process for personal gain. Protestors called for his expulsion from politics. Nevertheless, Mr. Thaksin held firm, insisting that the elections continue. Running unopposed, it came as no surprise that Mr. Thaksin and his TRT party swept to victory in more than 270 constituencies for the 500-seat House of Representatives. Mr. Thaksin garnered 16 million votes, or 57% of the total.

Perhaps Mr. Thaksin had hoped that an election victory would demonstrate that he—not the street protestors—was the democratically elected voice of the people. However, when on the evening of April 4 the king summoned Mr. Thaksin to the royal palace, it become clear the tycoon-turned-politician was in trouble. To this day, nobody knows what the king told Mr. Thaksin that night, but shortly after the hastily called meeting, Mr. Thaksin proclaimed that he would take a break from politics. The king, it seemed, had successfully reined in Mr. Thaksin. (Still others believe that there was no “whisper in the ear” and that the whole episode was political theater masterminded by Mr. Thaksin.)

In a matter of weeks, however, Mr. Thaksin jumped back into politics, albeit with the title of “caretaker” prime minister. Soon he was making official overseas trips and reportedly dashing off secret letters to foreign leaders, including U.S. President George W. Bush, complaining that he was being targeted by undemocratic forces.

It’s possible Mr. Thaksin’s decision to abandon his self-imposed repose was prompted by the nullification of the April 2 elections. In a landmark royal speech on April 25, the king referred to the political turmoil as a “mess” and implied that the elections had been undemocratic. He called on the country’s judiciary to sort things out.

On May 8, the Constitution Court nullified the April 2 elections, and shortly thereafter, the Criminal Court launched an investigation into alleged inappropriate behavior (read: pro-Thaksin favoritism) by members of the Election Commission, resulting in the unprecedented incarceration of three election commissioners.

Over the summer Mr. Thaksin came under attack from all sides, especially from an increasingly empowered judiciary, as the charismatic politician faced a barrage of legal cases against either him or his party. Some of these—such as a criminal case for perjury brought on by a former business associate—had been on the horizon for a while. Others emerged more recently, such as the Constitution Court’s case concerning the possible dissolution of TRT for election improprieties (other parties are facing similar probes), as well as the Auditor-General’s investigation into alleged tax evasion by members of Mr. Thaksin’s family. An investigation by the Ministry of Commerce into the controversial deal whereby the Thaksin family-owned telecommunications provider, Shin Corp., was sold in a $1.9 billion, tax-free deal to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings—could re-ignite the current political meltdown.

Mr. Thaksin’s speech on June 29, in which he accused a “charismatic, extra-constitutional figure” of interfering with the country’s democratic process, has only made matters worse. Later, when pressed by reporters, Mr. Thaksin refused to elaborate on his provocative remarks. Most analysts agree that he was referring to the president of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, himself a former prime minister and former commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army. Gen. Prem is also the king’s right-hand man. Whether Mr. Thaksin’s comments were therefore meant to be an indirect slight to the king, as some have surmised, remains the subject of debate. If that proves to be the case, then Mr. Thaksin’s challenging posture marks a significant departure in Thai politics as no prime minister has ever shown such audacity toward the palace.

Gen. Prem weighed in soon afterwards, firing his own salvo while dressed in full military uniform. In an address to the graduating cadets of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, he reminded the young soldiers that they served the king and not the prime minister. “In horse racing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride the horses. The jockeys do not own the horses,” the Bangkok Post reported him as saying. Gen. Prem continued: “A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers, but the real owners are the country and the king.” Subsequently, as reported by the Bangkok Post, the general told a gathering of naval officers that: “Individuals who have no ethics and morals are bad people who are full of greed. They may want to live comfortably with a lot of money. But if they have acquired wealth through illegal or unethical means, they no longer deserve to be in this country.” Again, while no names were mentioned, there was little doubt among commentators that the general was referring to Mr. Thaksin.

If Gen. Prem’s words didn’t send a strong enough message to Mr. Thaksin, army commander-in-chief General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin’s actions should have. In mid-July, Gen. Sonthi re-deployed a large contingent of pro-Thaksin officers out of key positions in Bangkok and into the hinterland provinces. Many of these transferees were part of the famous Class 10 group, former classmates of Mr. Thaksin from his days in the armed forces and known, vocal supporters of the prime minister. Their removal strips yet another potential weapon from Mr. Thaksin’s arsenal.

Which Way Out?

The king has long been revered in Thailand as an almost godlike figure. His subjects must prostrate before him, as seen in the photograph at TRT headquarters. Should they need to address his majesty directly, they do so using flowery, archaic language. This is one of the last countries in the world where a politician—indeed anyone—would want to challenge the king, directly or indirectly. When the palace speaks, everyone listens.

Some royal interventions are very public in nature. In a 1992 televised meeting, for instance, the king famously called for a peaceful resolution to a standoff between General Suchinda Kraprayoon and Major General Chamlong Srimuang. But these cases are rare. Even though he is entitled by the Constitution to intervene under limited circumstances, the king has only seldom done so. Other interventions have been more subtle, with the king exerting his influence through proxies such as Gen. Prem.

Yet Mr. Thaksin seems undaunted. The caretaker prime minister is determined to fight on, perhaps because he is genuinely convinced he has a true mandate from the people. It would be his duty, therefore, to stand by his supporters and continue fostering economic opportunities for the rural poor. There is no denying that he has been democratically elected, not just once but on several occasions. (Three, if the April elections are counted.) It is as if Mr. Thaksin is asking: Why should I be forced to step down?

Equally, it could be that Mr. Thaksin has too much to lose. If he steps down, he could be put on trial, have his assets frozen, maybe even imprisoned. Mr. Thaksin and TRT would be destroyed. Many believe that, at this stage, Mr. Thaksin either stays in office or is sent into exile—or worse. There are few alternatives, they say, since Mr. Thaksin has made too many enemies—hence his desperate clinging to power.

Or is it that Mr. Thaksin is looking at a longer time horizon? At 57, he is still very young and could quite feasibly lead Thailand for several decades to come. The same cannot be said for the 78-year-old king—the world’s longest serving monarch—who underwent life-threatening spinal surgery in July. Perhaps Mr. Thaksin believes that, if he manages to survive the challenges to his leadership, he might live to see the day when Thailand—under a new king (or queen)—might be a different place where the influence of the monarch is not as pervasive.

For Mr. Thaksin, the main questions are whether he will continue to run for election and, more importantly, whether he will stay on as prime minister if he wins. Most analysts expect Mr. Thaksin to run as planned, if only to ensure that TRT can get as many votes as possible. Many also believe that the TRT will win—assuming the party has not been dissolved by the courts in the interim. Mr. Thaksin could then decide to step aside for a period. But this sounds all too similar to the plan hatched in the immediate aftermath of the April elections, and is unlikely to satisfy the anti-Thaksin forces led by the pad, who say they will not stop short of getting Mr. Thaksin out of Thai politics for good.

A more prudent approach would be for Mr. Thaksin, if re-elected, to make greater concessions that go beyond simply stepping aside. These could include undertaking to genuinely embrace reform—constitutional reform, reform of his personal style of politics and an overhaul of his party. If such concessions were sufficiently broad, and the intent behind them pure, then Mr. Thaksin could bide his time until he stages a comeback in a fresh set of elections. Unfortunately, Mr. Thaksin’s track record to date shows a clear reluctance to make concessions and an even greater aversion to changing his personal style.

What are the next steps for the palace? No doubt it realizes that it must tread carefully in the coming months. Any overt intervention would entail its own set of risks. In 1992, the king moved to prevent an unelected figure from inflicting his will on the majority. This time, the leader, while hugely unpopular in certain quarters, nonetheless enjoys an overall majority support from the people. The fact that the king signed the electoral decree, paving the way for the October elections, is seen by many as a signal that he still believes the impasse can be overcome without his direct intervention.

There is still the chance Mr. Thaksin will get tripped up by one of the many legal cases he faces. For the king, this would conveniently make the problem Mr. Thaksin represents quietly disappear. But there is no guarantee of this happening, and Mr. Thaksin could still nimbly maneuver his way through the legal minefield and emerge unscathed.

To be sure, a military intervention to oust Mr. Thaksin is always a possibility, although some—but not all—analysts agree that this seems unlikely at this point. Those with less sanguine views predict that there will be no compromise between the two, and say that this game will produce only one winner and one loser. If this turns out to be the case, then the next weeks and months could see bloody confrontation on the streets of Bangkok and throughout the kingdom.

Clearly a more positive conclusion would see the king and Mr. Thaksin decide that they have to learn to coexist. It would be a painful scenario for both sides to endure, but in some ways the two do need each other. Mr. Thaksin needs the tacit approval of the king if his period in office is not to become stymied by ongoing calls for his resignation from the pad and its supporters. The palace would benefit from a period of stability in which to plan for succession and the next era of the monarchy in Thailand.

As such, the current impasse represents an opportunity to usher in a period of more transparent democracy, while providing a timely chance for a review of the relationship between democratic institutions and the palace. But to take full advantage of this opportunity, all sides must be genuinely willing to learn from this experience and embrace meaningful change. Any “Thai style” solution that allows for face-saving opportunities for the prime minister or the palace would only postpone the inevitable changes that are needed. The result would be an unsatisfactory resolution to the crisis that simply removes the symptom of the problem—Mr. Thaksin—without addressing the underlying challenges facing Thailand.

Mr. Murphy is deputy editor of the REVIEW

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